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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing
to admit evidence of the respondent's post-accident flight under
the facts of the instant case?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is published at
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Rules of Evidence, 103, 401, 402, and 403 will
determine the outcome of this appeal.

Due to the length of these

provisions, the text of each is set out in Appendix A of this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Fisher and respondent Trapp were involved in
an auto-pedestrian accident in Salt Lake City on June 3, 1982, at
approximately 9:15 p.m.

Fisher brought action against Trapp

alleging that the accident was the result of Trappfs negligent
driving.

The case was tried before a jury.

The jury returned a

verdict of "no cause of action" in favor of Trapp.
During an in-camera hearing before trial, Trapp
acknowledged that he had failed to stop at the scene of the accident.

Following the collision, Trapp continued northbound on

Redwood Road in Salt Lake City for some distance.
turned around and returned to the accident site.

Trapp then
Upon returning

to the scene, Trapp observed an adult rendering aid and assistance

to Fisher.
Trapp left the scene a second time only to return again.
Upon his return, Trapp spoke with a police officer, but did not
immediately identify himself as the driver of the car.

After

speaking with the officer, Trapp drove home.
Within 30 minutes of the accident, Trapp telephoned the
police and identified himself as the driver of the car.

(Record

at 270)
Before trial Trapp made a motion in limine to exclude
evidence that he failed to stop at the scene of the collision.
(Record at 271)

At the hearing on the motion, Fisher denied that

his injuries were aggravated in any way by Trappfs failure to
stop.

(Record at 272)

Rather, Fisher contended that such evi-

dence was admissible to create an inference of consciousness of
guilt.

(Record at 272)

exclude the evidence.

The trial court granted Trapp's motion to

The trial judge ruled that the prejudicial

effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value the evidence
of flight might have.

(Record at 273)

At trial, both Trapp and Patrick Fisher, appellant's
12-year old brother, testified how the accident occurred.
(Record at 282-286 and 309-318)

Appellant was unable to testify

since he has no conscious recollection of the accident.
at 303)

(Record

The investigating officer and experts for both parties

testified on the circumstances and cause of the accident.
(Record at 368, 69, 392 and 427)
The following facts surrounding the collision were
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established without serious dispute at trial:
1.

At approximately 9:15 p.m. on June 3, 1982, Trapp

was driving north in the east lane of Redwood Road near 400 North
in Salt Lake City.
2.

(Record at 282)

The evening was dark and the headlights on Trapp's

vehicle were lighted on low beam.
heavy.

Traffic on the highway was

(Record at 282)
3.

Just prior to the collision, Trapp's automobile was

traveling at approximately 38 to 40 miles per hour in a 45 mile
per hour traffic zone.
4.

(Record at 283, 298, 315 and 366)

As Trapp neared 4 30 North on Redwood Road, Fisher

and his brother Patrick were standing along the west shoulder of
Redwood Road, waiting for traffic to clear so they could cross
the street.
5.

(Record at 309-310)
As Fisher darted across the west lane of Redwood

Road, his brother saw the Trapp vehicle and yelled to Fisher.
(Record at 310, 315)
6.

Fisher was nine years old at the time of his acci-

dent with Trapp.
7.

(Record at 303)

There was no crosswalk at the point where Fisher

attempted to cross Redwood Road.
8.

(Record at 306, 367)

Fisher collided with the left front fender of.the

Trapp vehicle and fell backwards or "kind of sideways", landing
approximately one foot from where he was standing when he struck
the automobile.

(Record at 287, 296, 310, 316-318, 345, 413-416)

A physical examination of the Trapp automobile revealed
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no damage to the front grill, headlights, hood, or windshield.
The only physical evidence of the collision was a smudge of dirt
off of the left side of the vehicle.

(Record at 269)

Experts

for both parties agreed at trial that Fisher collided with the
left side of the Trapp automobile near the front wheel area.
(Record at 345, 348, 413-416)
Pursuant to the trial court's order, no evidence of
Trappfs post-collision conduct was introduced at trial.

The trial

jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent Trapp, finding no
negligence.

Appellant's motion for a new trial was denied, and

the matter was appealed.

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial

court verdict and judgment as set forth in the opinion attached to
appellant's brief.

(Record at 242)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

There is no inconsistency in the civil and criminal law
regarding admitting evidence of "flight" and the trial court did
not commmit reversible error in excluding evidence of Trapp's
post-collision conduct.
writ of certiorari.

There is no need for the issuance of a

ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY IN THE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL LAW REGARDING ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
"FLIGHT" WHICH JUSTIFIES THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
A.

The Decisions in Franklin and Bales are Clearly
Distinguishable From This Case.

The main focus of Fisher's petition is that this court
has held that evidence of flight is probative in State v.
Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987), and State v. Bales, 675 P.2d
573 (Utah 1983).

Fisher alleges that the Court of Appeals'

opinion in this case creates a separate rule for civil cases with
the appearance of inconsistency between the application of the
criminal law and the civil law.

It is therefore necessary to

review the holdings of these cases to understand the basis for the
same and to appreciate the scope of their applicability.
At the outset it is important to understand the
justification for admitting flight evidence in both criminal and
civil cases.

It has been admitted in certain cases where the

criminal defendant has denied involvement in the crime, such as in
Franklin and Bales, and also in civil personal injury cases
arising out of automobile accidents where the defendant denies his
involvement in causing the accident.
Under the circumstances of the Franklin case where
defendant denied his involvement in the crime, this court held that
evidence of flight was probative and cited the Bales decision in
support of its holding.

Franklin, 735 P.2d at 39. A comparison

of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case and the
reasoning of the Bales decision demonstrates that there is no
inconsistency in the criminal and civil law of the State of Utah.
The Bales case involved two defendants who were convicted
of aggravated burglary.

Witnesses had observed them under

suspicious circumstances leaving the home of the victim and police
were summoned.

When accosted, the defendants attempted to flee

from the police but were eventually apprehended.

The evidence of

the attempted flight was admitted with a cautionary instruction.
The court criticized the instruction and suggested a more
appropriate instruction should have been given.

Bales, 675 P.2d

at 575.
In discussing the rationale for the admission of such
evidence, the court pointed out the important policy considerations
applicable by citing extensively from other jurisdictions.
court stated:
State courts differ widely in their
attitudes toward flight instructions. For
example, Iowa permits an instruction that
flight is evidence of guilt under certain
circumstances. State v. Barr, Iowa, 259
N.W.2d 841, 842 (1977). At the opposite
extreme, South Carolina held a flight
instruction to be reversible error and
invalidated all flight instructions, no
matter what the circumstances. State v.
Grant, 275 S.C. 404, 407, 272 S.E.2d 169,
171 (1980). Other states have adopted
diversified intermediate positions. See
generally 25 A.L.R. 886-909 (1923 & Supp.
1983); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial §788 (1974).
The opinions of the federal courts have
provided the most extensive analysis. The
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The

United States Supreme Court has expressed
reservations about evidence of flight: "We
have consistently doubted the probative
value in criminal trials of evidence that
the accused fled the scene of an actual or
supposed crime." Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 483 n. 10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415
n. 10, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Responsive to
that concern, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has viewed flight as
twice removed from direct evidence of guilt.
That court recommended an instruction
explaining that flight does j]iot necessarily
reflect guilt, that jurors m£y (but need
not) consider flight as one circumstance
tending to show feelings of guilt, and that
they may (but need not) consider feelings of
guilt as evidence tending to show actual
guilt. Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d
767, 773 (D.C.Cir. 1963). In a later case,
that court stressed that flight instruction
should be used sparingly and should be
tempered by instructions explaining that
many motives may prompt flight, and thus a
jury should use caution before inferring
guilt from the fact of flight. Austin v.
United States, 414 F.2d 1155, 1157 (D.C.Cir.
1969). The instruction given in this case
would clearly be error in th^ District of
Columbia because it creates tloo direct a
Link between flight and guilt of the crime
charged. Bales, 675 P.2d at 574, 575.
Thus, it is clear that trial courts should exercise great
caution before admitting evidence of flight.

The trial court and

the Court of Appeals each properly rejected Fisher's argument that
the evidence should be admitted in this casle.
B.

Since Trapp Admitted His Involvement in the
Accident, There Was No Need to Admit the Evidence of
His Post-Accident Conduct.

The attention of the court is directed to the recitation
of the facts.

These facts have been set forth in some detail to

demonstrate why the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed

with Trapp that there was no need to introduce evidence of his
post-accident conduct.

Trapp does not deny that he was the driver

of the car involved in the accident.

It is also important to

understand that Fisher's older brother witnessed the accident and
there was nothing about his testimony that suggested any real
conflict in the evidence.

Thus, the probative value of

introducing the evidence was minimal and was far outweighed by the
possible prejudicial effect as set forth below.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF TRAPP'S POST-COLLISION
CONDUCT.
A.

The Determination of Evidentiary Matters is Properly
Left to the Sound Discretion of the Trial Court.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence grants trial
courts considerable discretion in determining whether evidence,
although relevant, should be excluded on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.

This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op

Merchantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), reaffirmed the
generally recognized principle that a reviewing court should
generally defer to the trial court's determination of evidentiary
matters.
In Terry, the plaintiff customer brought a malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against the
defendant merchant arising from an alleged shoplifting incident.
At trial, the defendant wished to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's prior conviction and its surrounding facts as affecting the

issue of damages.

The trial court excluded the introduction of

the evidence, finding that the proffered evidence would have
misled and prejudiced the jury.
In holding that the trial judge committed no error in
balancing the probative value of the evidehce against its prejudicial effect, the court stated, "When the trial judge weighs the
matter and makes the determination, his ruling should be looked
upon with indulgence and not disturbed unless it clearly appears
that he abused his discretion."

Id. at 323 (emphasis added).

The broad discretion granted to tibial courts under the
Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the relevancy, materiality, or
prejudicial nature of evidence is shown in Reiser v. Lohner, 641
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) .
In Reiser, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal
injuries sustained as a result of the defendant doctor's alleged
negligent medical treatment.

The defendant doctor had failed to

perform two medical tests on the plaintiff'|s mother while plaintiff was j_n utero.

Plaintiff was born with severe brain damage

and was later diagnosed as suffering from c|erebral palsy and
spastic quadraplegia, all of which was indisputably not caused by
the defendant's failure to adminster the tw|o medical procedures on
plaintiff's mother.

Prior to trial, defendant made a motion in

limine to exclude evidence that the medical procedures had not
been taken until just prior to the plaintiff's birth.

The trial

court granted the motion.
On appeal, this court refused to reverse the trial

court's evidentiary ruling, stating:
The trial judge was within the bounds of his
authority when he excluded the tests (or
lack of) pertaining to Rh sensitivity. It
is undisputed that Rh sensitivity was not
the cause of the child's injury, and any
evidence as to the diagnosis of such sensitivity therefore appears to be without
relevance. When this is coupled with the
potential prejudicial effect such evidence
might have upon the jury, the trial judge
was well within his discretion to exclude
tt. Reiser, 641 P.2d at 97 (emphasis added)
In view of the clear statements of this court in Terry and
Reiser, and the underlying principle of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, the balancing of probative value against prejudicial
effect must necessarily rest within the sound discretion of the
trial court.

Since this court has heretofore granted broad

discretion to the trial courts of this state in making evidentiary
rulings, the trial judge's exclusion of evidence of Trapp's postcollision conduct should not be disturbed absent evidence of clear
abuse of discretion or manifest error.
B.

The Prejudicial Effect of Evidence of Trapp's
Post-Collision Conduct Substantially Outweighs
the Probative Value of Such Evidence in the Instant
Action.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the
applicable standard for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the
grounds of prejudice:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
If its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
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waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution,
605 P.2d at 323, n. 31, stated:
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . .
if it has the tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by impropet means, or if
tt appeals to the jury's sympathies, or
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instincts to punish or otherwise causes a
jury to base its decision on something other
than the established proposition of the
case. (quoting Lease America Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 88 wis.2d
395, 276 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1979) ) .
The trial court in the instant ca^e noted that evidence
of flight may be relevant under certain circumstances.
272)

However, the court held that under ti\e

(Record at

facts of this case,

the limited probative value of evidence of Trapp's post-collision
conduct was outweighed by the tendency of \\he evidence to "inflame
the jury."

(Record at 272-273)

The tendency of evidence of post-

accident flight to unfairly prejudice jurieis is well recognized:
[I]n many situations, the inference of
consciousness of guilt of the| particular
crime is so uncertain and ambiguous and the
evidence so prejudicial that one is forced
to wonder whether the evidence is not
directed to punishing the "wicked" generally
rather than resolving the issue of guilt of
the offense charged.
* * *

In addition, the potential for prejudice for flight evidence should be weighed
against is probative value. (Critical scrutiny is called for in each particular case.
McCormick on Evidence §271, (lawyers 3d Ed.
1984) (emphasis added).
Appellant asserts that evidence of Trapp's post-collision

conduct raises several inferences, any of which would be helpful
to the jury in the determination of the instant action.

Although

the relevancy of a piece of evidence proffered is crucial, the
probative value of the evidence, standing alone, does not determine its admissibility.

Terry, 605 P.2d at 322. The excluded

evidence in the instant case is, at best, only tangentially relevant, due its tendancy to allow the jury to speculate on facts
unsupported in the record.

The trial court did not err in prohi-

biting such potentially prejudicial evidence.

Other courts have

likewise noted that facts which support only conjectural inferences have little, if any, probative value.

Since facts sup-

porting only conjectural inferences have such limited probative
value, at least one jurisdiction has held them to be per se inadmissible.

Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727

F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Colorado law); and Dolan v.
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (1972).
Although appellant cites several cases which hold evidence of post-accident flight admissible under certain circumstances, other courts have held such evidence to be inadmissible.
See Freeman v. Anderson, 279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983);
Spencer v. Adams, 37 Ga.Ct.App. 344, 140 S.E. 390 (1927); Clark v.
Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467 (1957); and Barnes v. Gaines, 668
P.2d 1175 (Okla.Ct.App. 1983).
A trial court's ruling under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence is most often a fact intensive decision that should not be
applied blindly to cases involving different facts and circum-

stances.

Flight from the scene of a tragejdy may be quite as

consistent with innocence as with negligence.

One, who, despite

due care, kills or injures another, may thjrough ignorance of the
law or through panic flee from the scene op his act, and yet be
perfectly innocent.

It would be a dangerous rule which would

permit the jury to consider flight as evidence of negligence in
every case.
(1911).

See People v. Cismadija, 167tylich.210, 132 N.W. 489

The equivocal nature of respondent's flight under the

circumstances of this case should be of patticular concern to this
court.
The cases cited by appellant for ihe proposition that
evidence of post-accident flight is admissible are clearly
distinguishable on their facts.

First, th0 trial of the instant

action demonstrated that there is little, if any, dispute how the
accident occurred.

Trapp admitted that he did not see Fisher

until the moment of impact.

(Record at 285|) It was undisputed at

trial that the point of impact was on the slide of the Trapp
vehicle.

(Record at 296, 310, 345, 369, 37)1, and 413-416)
In Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snydbr, 161 F.2d 323 (5th

Cir. 1947), cited by appellant, there were (serious disputes on
whether the defendant was speeding prior to the moment of impact,
whether the defendant was on the wrong side of the road, and
whether defendant had failed to dim his lights as required by state
law.

Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 76 P.2^3 279 (1938), is

similarly distinguishable.

In Shaddy, ther£ were a serious factual

disputes on whether the defendant's truck h^d its headlights
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lighted, whether the defendant's truck struck the decedent on the
highway, and whether the defendant was speeding at the moment of
impact.

Other cases cited by appellant involving serious factual

disputes include Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962),
and State v. Ford, 109 Conn, 490, 146 A. 828 (1929).
Second, unlike the instant case, where eyewitnesses to
the accident were able to testify as to how the accident occurred,
several of the cases cited by appellant involve factual situations
where there were no eyewitnesses to the accident.

As a result, in

those cases there was little, if any, way to determine how the
accident occurred.

In the instant case, the jury was able to hear

testimony both from Fisherfs brother, Patrick, and from Trapp on
how the accident occurred.
Since the trial jury in the instant case heard direct
testimony on the facts and circumstances of the accident, the jury
did not need to consider the possible inferences that Fisher
attempted to raise through the introduction of evidence of Trapp1s
post-collision conduct.

Such conjectural inferences could have

confused the jury and distracted them from deciding the case on
the direct testimony of the two eyewitnesses to the accident.
Cases cited by appellant where no eyewitnesses were available to
testify how the accident occurred include:

Brooks v. E. J. Willig

Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802 (1953);
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929); Busbee v.
Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla.Ct.App. 1965); Waycot v. Northeast
Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Maine 1983); Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich.

420, 280 N.W.2d 9 (1979); and Jones v. Str|elecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231
A.2d 558 (1967) .
Third, several of the cases cited by appellant are
distinguishable from the instant case, sinfce the evidence of
flight was admissible to impeach the credibility of defendants who
denied involvement in the accidents giving rise to those cases.
See Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. S.fc. 1963); Greenwood v.
Bailey, 184 So. 289 (Ala.Ct.App. 1938); Gr£ys v. Connecticut Co.,
123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938); Busbee vh Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17
(Fla.Ct.App. 1965); and Vuillemot v. August J. Claverie & Co., 125
So. 168 (La. 1929).
In the instant case, respondent Tifapp voluntarily
telephoned the police within 30 minutes of the accident to advise
them that he had been involved in the accident with appellant
Fisher.

Furthermore, at trial, Trapp uneqi^ivocally testified that

he was the driver of the vehicle involved iln the accident giving
rise to this case.

Under such circumstances, evidence of Trappfs

post-collision conduct has little, if any, probative value.
Fourth, as several of the cases cijted by appellant
suggest evidence of post-accident flight ma|y have probative value
where there is an allegation that the plain|tiff is entitled to
punitive damages as a result of the defendant's gross negligence
or where the pLaintiff!s injuries were aggravated due to the
defendant's failure to stop and render assistance.

See Brooks v.

E. J. Willig Truck Transportation Co., 40 C^1.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802
(1953); Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La.App. £72, 127 So. 764
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(1930); Richards v. Office Products Co., 55 Ohio App.2d 143, 380
N.E.2d 725 (1977); and Hallman v. Cushman, 196 S.C. 402, 13 S.E.2d
498 (1941).

These cases are clearly distinguishable from the

instant case, since Fisher's complaint against Trapp did not
allege that the accident was due to any gross negligence on the
part of Trapp nor does Fisher contend that his injuries were
aggravated due to Trapp's failure to immediately stop and render
aid at the accident

scene.

Fifth, unlike in Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 420, 280
N.W.2d 9 (1979), and Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d
558 (1967), cited by appellant, the instant case does not involve
the special public policy concerns eminating from an unidentified
motorist act.

It is clear that the public policy considerations

underlying under such acts favor compensation.

Since the flight

of the unidentified motorist may result in the plaintiff losing
the evidence necessary to establish his claim under such an act,
courts are more willing to allow inferences to be drawn from the
driver's flight to allow injured parties to recover, who without
the inference would most likely be unable to recover.

The public

policy concerns present in Johnson and Jones are not present in
the instant case.

Although some evidence has been lost due to

Fisher's inability to testify at trial, ample evidence on how the
accident occurred was presented at trial.
In sum, the cases cited by Fisher demonstrate the probative value of evidence of flight under certain limited circumstances:

1) where there are serious fact disputes surrounding the

accident; 2) where there are no eyewitnesses to the accident;
3) where the defendant denies involvement fin the accident;
4) where the plaintiff's injuries are aggravated by the flight;
and 5) where special statutory based public policy concerns favor
a finding of negligence.

The instant action does not fall within

any of the above-cited categories.

Under the circumstances of

this case, the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of Trapp's
post-collision conduct clearly outweighs t^ie probative value of
such evidence.
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERREO IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE OF TRAPP'S POST-COLLISION CONDUCT,
SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND E|OES NOT WARRANT
REMAND.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that prejudicial error will not occur unless the excluded evidence affects
a substantial right of the aggrieved party.

In determining

whether a substantial right of the appellanjt has been affected by
the exclusion of evidence of Trapp's post-cpllision conduct, this
court should consider the whole record.

Th|is court should not

find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court unless
this court, after reviewing the whole record, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in its
ruling.

Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanfiff, 650 P.2d 375

(Alaska 1982).

The test for determining whether the alleged error

on the part of the trial court is prejudicial to the appellant is
whether, upon a review of the record, it sufficiently appears that

the rights of the appellant have been injuriously affected by the
error, or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice.

See 5

Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §783 (1962).
In Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 589
P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1978), this court established that "a jury
verdict will only be upset where the error committed was so
substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the result would have been different in the absence of such
error.'1

Although appellant asserts that the exclusion of evidence

of Trapp's post-collision conduct affected his substantial rights,
the better-reasoned authorities find that the exclusion of evidence with only slight or conjectural value does not constitute
reversible error.

See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §802 (1962).

As previously stated herein, the evidence of Trapp's
post-collision conduct supported only conjectural inferences of
negligence.

Such inferences have little, if any, probative value.

See Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985); and Dolan v.
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1972).

Since the

excluded evidence in the instant case had such little probative
value, it is impossible to conclude that there is "a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different" had such
evidence been admitted at trial.

Absent such a showing, this

court should hold that the trial court's ruling did not result in
a miscarriage of justice or the denial of any substantial right of
the appellant.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court was justified in (excluding the evidence
of Trapp's post-accident conduct and propejrly denied Fisher's
motion for a new trial.

The Court of Appeals was correct in its

decision upholding the lower court's ruling and refusing to
overturn the jury verdict and judgment entered thereon.

This

court should deny the petition for certiorari.
Respectfully submitted.
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APPENDIX A
RULE 103
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or exclilides evidence unless a
substantial right of party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to
strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the Specific ground was not
apparent from the context; of
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any
other or further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and
the ruling thereon. It may direct the makijng of an offer in
question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury ca^es, proceedings shall
be conducted, to the extent practicable, sq as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means,
such as making statements or offers of proojf or asking questions
in the hearing of the jury
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantiall rights although they
were not brought to the attention of the court.
RULE 401
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIpENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is ojf consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or lc
_ess probable than
it would be without the evidence.

Al

RULE 402
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY
ADMISSIBLE: IRRELEVANT
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this State. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
RULE 403
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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